Journal of Civil Law Studies
Volume 13
Number 2 2020

Article 3

12-30-2020

The Birth Mother’s Assent to Adoption and the Limitation of
Autonomy of Women’s Will in Spanish Law: A Proposal de lege
ferenda
María Victoria Mayor del Hoyo

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls
Part of the Civil Law Commons

Repository Citation
María Victoria Mayor del Hoyo, The Birth Mother’s Assent to Adoption and the Limitation of Autonomy of
Women’s Will in Spanish Law: A Proposal de lege ferenda, 13 J. Civ. L. Stud. (2020)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol13/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU Law
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

THE BIRTH MOTHER’S ASSENT TO ADOPTION AND THE
LIMITATION OF AUTONOMY OF WOMEN’S WILL IN
SPANISH LAW: A PROPOSAL DE LEGE FERENDA
María Victoria Mayor del Hoyo *
I. Introduction: Adoption and the Constitutional System ........... 250
II. Declarations of Will ............................................................... 251
III. Rationale for the Birth Mother’s Assent ............................... 253
IV. Characteristics of the Birth Mother’s Assent........................ 256
V. Form of the Birth Mother’s Assent ........................................ 260
VI. Birth Mother’s Capacity to Assent ....................................... 263
VII. The Six-Week Period: A Limitation on the Autonomy of
Women’s Will ........................................................................ 267
ABSTRACT
Even though in Spanish law the act establishing the adoption is
judicial in nature, declarations of will have special relevance in the
process, since they are a necessary precondition for the adoption.
This work focuses on the assent of the biological mother, who is affected by and has an interest in the adoption process, even if not a
party to it herself. In this work, the foundation, configuration, and
characteristics of this assent are studied, as well as the form of her
declaration of will, and the ability of the mother to offer it. Special
attention is paid to the minimum time limit for issuing this declaration. This time limit is based on the European Convention on Adoption and constitutes a legal limitation on women’s autonomy. As an
* Professor of Law, Universidad de Zaragoza (Spain). The research for this
article was carried out within the framework of the Research Project of the Ministry of Science and Innovation of the Government of Spain: PID2019105489RB-I00 “Vulnerabilidad patrimonial y personal: retos jurídicos” (Principal
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within the framework of the Reference Research Group recognised by the Government of Aragon “Ius Familiae” (S30_20R) (Principal Researcher: Carlos Martínez de Aguirre Aldaz).
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alternative to this limitation, we come with a proposal de lege
ferenda which ensures a balance between the need for certain precautions and the free exercise of women’s decision-making power.
This proposal is applicable to all European systems and is consistent with the European Convention, which introduces this limitation on women’s autonomy. Finally, a revision of the European Convention is proposed to adapt it to the growing demand for increased
autonomy for all persons.
Keywords: Spain, adoption, autonomy of will, European Convention on Adoption, filiation, legal capacity, personal acts, protection
of minors, Spanish law
I. INTRODUCTION: ADOPTION AND ITS CONSTITUTIVE ACT
Spanish Law 21/1987, of November 11, amended specific articles of the Civil Code (CC) and the Civil Procedure Law in the area
of adoption with the aim of configuring adoption as an instrument
of family integration for minors without a family life and to fight
against child trafficking. 1 In doing so, the configuration of adoption
as a legal transaction between parents and adopters was left behind,
replaced by a system that constituted adoption through a judicial resolution with prior administrative control. This system, with some
changes, has remained in place until today. The most notable modifications in this regard come from Organic Law 1/1996, of January
15, on the Legal Protection of Minors (OLLPM) and Organic Law
26/2015, of July 28, 2015, on the modification of the System for the
Protection of Children and Adolescents. 2
In contrast to the system of conventional constitutive act, this is
a system of constitution through a public authority, 3 specifically, a
1. The legislator understood—as stated in the Preamble to the act—that
there was an almost complete lack of control over the actions preceding adoption,
something which was “necessary if it is to fulfil its true social purpose of protecting minors deprived of a family life.”
2. Other laws that have amended the Civil Code in this area are: Law
13/2005, Law 54/2007, and Law 15/2015.
3. See the distinction between these two systems made by MIGUEL ÁNGEL
PÉREZ ÁLVAREZ, LA NUEVA ADOPCIÓN 201 et seq. (Civitas 1989).
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judicial authority. Adoption is constituted by judicial resolution as
stated in article 176.1 CC. However, this system relies on strong administrative intervention, given that, save for exceptional cases, the
public entity has the exclusive authority to initiate the judicial proceeding by presenting the adoption proposal before the judge. In addition, before the judicial proceeding, the public entity is responsible
for issuing the declaration of the adopters’ suitability and their selection. 4 Likewise, it has the capacity to create a guardianship for
adoption 5 before the submission of the proposal. 6 On the other hand,
the system does not dispense with the declarations of will of those
who are impacted by the adoption and any other subjects involved. 7
As a rule, the iter implemented is as follows: the public entity
declares the suitability of the adopters, proceeds to their selection
and, when appropriate, creates a guardianship for the purpose of
adoption. Subsequently, it presents the adoption proposal to the
judge thus initiating the judicial adoption procedure. The judge will
gather the pertinent declaration of will and, if necessary, will carry
out a hearing. Included in this are all the steps considered necessary
to assess whether the adoption is appropriate, taking into account the
interests of the adoptee and the suitability of the adopter. Finally, if
the judge considers it appropriate, he or she will issue a constitutive
resolution.
II. DECLARATIONS OF WILL
The fact that the constitutive act is—as indicated—of a judicial
nature does not imply that the will of the persons involved is irrelevant. It is still present, but it has ceased to be constitutive and has
instead become a necessary precondition to the constitutive act. The
4. Art. 176.2-176.3 CC.
5. See art. 176 CC: the guardianship for adoption (“guarda con fines de
adopción”) is an institution that allows the minor who needs protection to live
with their future adopters while the judicial procedure for the constitution of the
adoption is processed.
6. Id.
7. Art. 177 CC.
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adoption is constituted by a resolution of the judge that requires, as
a necessary precondition, the issuance of certain declarations of will.
If these requirements are not met, the adoption cannot be constituted
(doing so regardless would affect its validity). However, the opinions contained in these declarations are not binding on the judge,
who is free to decide on the constitution of the adoption. 8
It seems logical that the will of interested parties should not be
excluded. The parent-child relationship that constitutes adoption
cannot be imposed. It is not a relationship originated in nature but
built by law and based on the will of the persons involved. On the
other hand, adoption does not only concern the new parents and the
adoptive child, but there are other subjects involved whose rights
and legitimate interests must be respected. The fact that their declaration of will is a prerequisite for the constitution of the adoption is
fundamental to guarantee this respect. Finally, declarations of will
provide the judge with valuable elements for his or her final decision. 9
There is not a single category of declarations of will. In fact, the
law distinguishes three types, even attributing to them different
names, according to the degree of involvement of the person in the
adoption and the effectiveness given by law: consent, assent, hearing.
In light of article 177 CC, if the person who expresses his or her
will is a party to the adoption, this declaration is qualified as consent.
Thus, according to the first paragraph of the provision, it is up to the
8. See JOSÉ LUIS LACRUZ BERDEJO ET AL., IV EL NUEVO RÉGIMEN DE LA FAMILIA: ACOGIMIENTO Y ADOPCIÓN 86 et seq. (Civitas 1989). The authors referred

to the manifestations of will as necessary, but not binding, procedural presuppositions. This observation was well received by other authors, such as, for example,
PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 204. See also JOSÉ JAVIER HUALDE SÁNCHEZ, COMENTARIOS A LAS REFORMAS DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL 185 (Bercovitz Rodríguez-Cano ed.,
Tecnos 1993); BARTOLOME VARGAS CABRERA, LA PROTECCIÓN DE MENORES EN
EL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO 220 (Comares 1994).
9. See PILAR GUTIÉRREZ SANTIAGO, CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA ADOPCIÓN: DECLARACIONES RELEVANTES 96 (Aranzadi 2000). Gutiérrez highlights how the jurisprudence of the Audiencias Provinciales refers to the intervention of the various persons as evaluative elements.
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adopters and adoptees over the age of twelve to give their consent. 10
Consent must necessarily be given, it can never be waived, and it
must be in favor of the adoption.
If the person who expresses his or her will is not a party to the
adoption, it is considered either assent or a mere hearing, depending
on the degree to which the adoption is affected.
Assent must come from the biological parents of the unemancipated adoptee who have not been deprived of their parental authority, are not involved in a legal case regarding deprivation, or who
have not been suspended in accordance with the terms of article
177.2 of the Civil Code. The spouse or partner of the adopter must
also give assent. In certain cases, the law allows for this declaration
of will to be waived; for example, when those who are to provide it
are unable to do so. However, when this declaration of will is mandatory, it must also be in favor of the adoption.
The judge must simply hear from the following persons: (i) the
parents who have not been deprived of their parental authority when
their assent is not required; (ii) when appropriate, the guardian or
the foster family; and (iii) the adoptee under the age of twelve. It is
not necessary that the will expressed by these persons is in favor of
the adoption, although it is necessary that the hearing exists.
III. RATIONALE FOR THE BIRTH MOTHER’S ASSENT
In this study, we will examine the assent of the biological
mother, which is necessary—along with that of the father, if paternity is legally determined—to validly constitute the adoption of the
child.
The Civil Code requires this assent in article 177.2. This assent
is based not on the legal relationship of filiation11 but on parental
10. The exception to the rule is the case of a child under 12 years of age, who,
because of his or her special conditions, even though he or she is a party, is simply
heard.
11. Authors agree on this, see PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 180 et seq.; Ignacio
Díaz de Lezcano Sevillano, Consentimiento, asentimiento y ausencia en la nueva
Ley de Adopción, 590 REVISTA CRÍTICA DE DERECHO INMOBILIARIO 28 (1989);
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authority. 12 This distinction is revealed by the exemption from the
requirement when parental authority no longer exists or is affected.
In particular, the need for the parent’s assent is excluded: (a) when
the adoptee is emancipated, 13 since the adoptee is no longer subject
to the parental authority of his or her biological parents; (b) or when
the parents have been deprived of their parental authority, 14 are involved in a pending case for deprivation or have been suspended
from these rights for two years following a declaration of abandonment. 15 In this sense, the doctrine justifies the need for assent by
noting that adoption extinguishes parental authority 16 and, therefore,
cannot take place outside of it. 17
Eduardo Hijas Fernández, Las manifestaciones de voluntad en la constitución de
la adopción, 583 REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO 2748 (1993); VARGAS, supra
note 8, at 232.
12. Parental authority (known as “patria potestad”) is regulated by articles
154 et seq. CC. Art. 154 states the following:
Non-emancipated children shall be under the parents’ parental authority.
Parental authority shall be exercised always for the benefit of the children, according to their personality, and respecting their rights and physical and psychological integrity. This authority comprises the following
duties and powers: 1. To look after them, to have them in their company,
feed them, educate them and provide them with a comprehensive upbringing. 2. To represent them and to manage their property.
13. See arts. 314 et seq. CC. Emancipation occurs by attaining the age of majority (18 years old). But a minor who has reached the age of 16 can be emancipated by his or her parents or a judge. The emancipated minor is no longer under
parental authority and may govern his or her person and property as if he or she
were of age, although in order to perform some acts of special importance he or
she needs the authorization of his or her parents. The juridical relationship between parent and child does not disappear with emancipation.
14. Deprivation of parental authority is regulated in art. 170 CC: “The father
or the mother may be deprived in whole or in part of their authority pursuant to a
judgement on grounds of breach of the duties inherent thereto, or rendered in
criminal or matrimonial proceedings.”
15. Art. 172 CC states:
If the public entity entrusted with the protection of minors in the respective territory were to become aware that a minor is in a situation of neglect, it shall have ipso iure the guardianship of such minor. . . . A situation of neglect shall be deemed to exist de facto as a result of the breach
or the impossible or inadequate exercise of the protection duties set forth
by the laws for the custody of minors, when they should be deprived of
the necessary moral or material assistance.
16. Art. 169.3 CC.
17. See, e.g., José Luis Artero Felipe, El elemento volitivo en la adopción, 12
ACCIONES E INVESTIGACIONES SOCIALES 65 (2001); BLANCA GESTO ALONSO, EL
PROCEDIMIENTO DE ADOPCIÓN 67 (Aranzadi 2013).
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I believe, however, that the assent of the parents must transcend
parental authority and be based on the juridical relationship between
parent and child. Adoption does indeed put an end to parental authority, but it only does so because the filiation bond is extinguished.
What is essential is not that parental authority ends, but that filiation
disappears. Parental authority is merely an institution for the protection of minors that the law links to parenthood. The parental relationship has legal content and a significance in the lives of those
who form a part of it that is much more important in intensity and
extension than the mere attribution of this temporary function-duty.
Through the regulation of filiation, the law attributes legal support
to a relationship that is given by nature itself. The legal bond established according to the rules for determining parentage can only be
destroyed if it is demonstrated in a judicial proceeding that the paternity or maternity is not authentic. If they are valid, the bond remains. Notwithstanding the above, by regulating adoption, the legal
system has provided for the creation of a parent-child relationship
not based on biology. Since the constitution of this new bond necessarily entails the disappearance of the original bond, the biological
parents, as parties directly involved, must take part: the relationship
that the law created to recognize their natural bond will cease to exist. That is the basis of their assent to adoption.
That said, if the parents do not comply with their parental duties
and place their child in a situation of need, then the above mentioned
does not prevent that priority be given to the child’s best interests
over that of their parents. This makes it easier for the State to reintegrate the child into another family through adoption, without the
need for the assent of the biological parents, thus depriving them of
the possibility of deciding on the continuity of the parent-child relationship.
What would exclude the juridical relationship between parent
and child as a basis for parental assent to adoption is the possibility
that an emancipated child could be adopted without the assent of the
parents. This adoption would be a unilateral break of the parent-
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child bond without the child having a real need to be protected or
without the parents having failed in their duties; and this fact would
leave them defenseless. Naturally, precautions should be taken to
avoid the prevention of a fair adoption due to a malicious refusal of
the parents.
It should not be forgotten that the relationship between a parent
and a child is the strongest to exist. If the law is not indifferent to
the more—admittedly—banal or collateral interests of other subjects, such as those of the adopter’s spouse or partner, it should not
disregard the interests that derive from this essential bond. These
are, in fact, interests that are taken into account by international conventions: the Convention on the Rights of the Child states in article
9 that “States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated
from his or her parents against their will” and in article 21, it specifies, concerning adoption, that those persons involved, including the
parents, must give their “informed consent.” The European Convention on Adoption 18 also requires the assent of the parents and that
the parents are duly informed: “of the effects of their consent, in
particular whether or not an adoption will result in the termination
of the legal relationship between the child and his or her family of
origin.” And the European Court of Human Rights has stated that
adoption without the assent of the mother may be contrary to the
right to family life proclaimed by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 19
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BIRTH MOTHER’S ASSENT
The assent of the biological mother, just as—when applicable—
that of the father, is presented as a necessary but non-binding manifestation of the will of the person who is not a party to the adoptive
bond but is affected by it.

18. European Convention on the Adoption of Children, art. 5(1)(a).
19. See Omorefe c. Espagne, No. 69339/16, June 23, 2020.
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Her favorable will is a condition sine qua non for the valid constitution of the adoption. With that manifestation of her will, the
birth mother, not a party to the bond but affected by it, does not assume the content of the juridical relationship of the adoption, with
the rights and duties that compose it, but authorizes the production
of those effects. 20 This authorization, is necessary, but—just as with
consent—not binding for the judge. The judge is not obligated to
grant the adoption, but once the necessary requirements have been
met, he or she can decide freely in the best interests of the child.
The mere existence of the biological mother, and in some cases
of the legally identified biological father, does not make her assent
to the adoption mandatory, but the concurrence of certain circumstances provided by law is necessary. As already mentioned, the
adoptee must not be emancipated, and the biological parent must not
be deprived of his or her parental authority by a final judgement, nor
have legal grounds for such deprivation, nor have his or her parental
authority suspended within the period of two years after the notification of the declaration of abandonment without opposition or with
opposition dismissed. 21
However, the Civil Code admits the possibility that, when assent
is required due to the circumstances indicated, it can be dispensed
with if the mother who is obliged to provide it is unable to do so.
Reasons for this may include, for example, that her capacity to act
has changed, that she has been declared judicially absent, that her
whereabouts are unknown so that it is impossible to summon her, or
that if, having been summoned, she does not appear. 22
20. This function of authorization of legal effects has already been referred
to by VARGAS supra note 8, at 227. See PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 191, he observes
that assent is not a diminished or attenuated consent but is a qualified consentauthorization for the actions of those who are not subject to the relationship that
is to be constituted by judicial decision. See also Miguel Ángel Pérez Álvarez,
Comentario al art. 177 del Código civil, in CÓDIGO CIVIL COMENTADO 937 (2d
ed., Pedro de Pablo Contreras et al. eds., Civitas 2016).
21. Art. 177.2.2 CC.
22. See art. 177.2 CC; see also art. 38.3, Law 15/2015, of July 2, 2015, Law
on Voluntary Jurisdiction Law [hereinafter LVJ].
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The basis and importance of the mother’s assent have already
been pointed out. However, sometimes, situations of impossibility
or neglect of duties may arise in connection with the manifestation
of this will, which may even block the adoption. In such cases where
the judge cannot count on the mother’s assent, if he or she believes
that adoption is the best option and that it stands a good chance of
being a successful one, preventing the judge from establishing the
adoption would cause significant damage to the minor, who would
be deprived of the protection that this measure of family integration
offers him. For this reason, the legislator—balancing these circumstances and the interests of the child and the mother—is inclined to
favor the benefit of the child. Thus, the legislator regulates the possibility that, in these cases, the adoption can be validly constituted
even without the mandatory assent, sacrificing, if necessary, the possible interest of the mother, who is still a third party in the adoption.
In short, it seeks to avoid a situation in which a failure to comply
with a presupposition—intended to guarantee the interests of a third
party—caused either by impossibility or by the abandonment of obligations of the holder of such interests, might prevent an unprotected minor access to a family-integration measure. It should not be
forgotten that adoption is a measure for the protection of minors.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the law provides for the possibility that a mother who has been unable to give her assent through
no fault of her own may, if certain circumstances arise, request the
termination of the adoption under the terms of article 180.2 CC. 23
As to the particular or abstract nature of the mother’s authorization of effects, article 177.2 in fine expressly excludes the possibility
that in adoptions requiring a prior proposal from the public body,
the assent of the parents may be given to specific adopters. The provision, which had been contained in the Law on Civil Procedure of
1881 in art. 1830 (since 1987), has been relocated to the Civil Code
23. See Antonio Vela Sánchez, Irrevocabilidad, nulidad y extinción de la
adopción, 70 ANUARIO DE DERECHO CIVIL 1230 et seq. (2017) for a work on the
extinction of adoption.
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by Law 26/2015. In order to avoid irregular actions and child trafficking, the law excludes biological parents from decisions related
to the selection of adopters, which is the responsibility of the administration. To admit assent with respect to specific adopters would
imply interference in the selection work of the public entity, which
would then be seen as subject to the control and approval of the parents. Precisely for this reason, the precept refers to cases in which a
previous proposal is required: when there is no proposal from the
public body, which is the exception, the adopters are determined by
the legally foreseen circumstances and—theoretically—they are not
chosen. 24 On the other hand, in such cases, in reality, either the prohibition is illogical (when the adopter is the spouse or partner of the
parent 25) or it is simply not possible or necessary to obtain their assent (when the parents have died and an uncle is going to adopt the
orphan, 26 when the child is emancipated 27 or when a guardian is going to adopt the child already under their care 28). In view of the
above, it can be said that, in general, the effect authorized by the
biological mother, and in some cases the father, is the rupture of

24. Art. 176 CC states that:
[N]o proposal shall be required if the prospective adoptee meets any of
the following circumstances:
1. Being an orphan and a relative of the adopter in the third degree by
consanguinity or affinity.
2. Being a child of the spouse or person partnered with the adopter in an
emotional relationship akin to marriage.
3. Having been in legal foster care for more than a year under a measure
of a pre-adoptive foster care, or having been under the adopter’s guardianship for the same time.
4. Being of legal age or an emancipated minor.
25. See art. 176.2.2 CC.
26. See art. 176.2.1 CC.
27. See art. 176.2.4 CC.
28. See art. 176.2.3 CC: The prohibition would make sense only in the case
of adoption—without proposal—by the pre-adoptive guardian for more than one
year, as there would have been a prior selection by the public entity and there
could be interference.
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their legal parental bonds and the constitution of new ones, 29 with
indifference as to who these bonds are formed with. 30
Finally, the declaration of the mother’s will is of a strictly personal nature, as it will be shown below. This excludes the possibility
of representation. Proof of this is that, as has been mentioned, article
177.2 CC establishes that assent can be dispensed with when the
person who must give it is unable to do so. 31
V. FORM OF THE BIRTH MOTHER’S ASSENT
Law 26/2015 has introduced a new paragraph in article 177 CC,
which refers jointly to the form of issuance of consents and assents:
“they shall be freely granted, with the required legal form and in
writing, after information about the consequences thereof has been
provided.” Since it refers to the “required legal form,” it is necessary
to refer to the specific provisions of the law in this regard: in particular to article 177.2 of the Civil Code and, especially, articles 35.2
and 37.1 of Law 15/2015, of July 2, 2015, on Voluntary Jurisdiction
(LVJ)—which replaces the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law
(LCP). 32
29. It should be noted that except in the case of an open adoption, the possibility of the birth parents having knowledge of the specific adopters proposed is,
or should be, limited. Art. 39.2 LVJ establishes that the proceedings will be carried out with appropriate reservation, avoiding in particular that the family of
origin has knowledge of the adoptive one. So it would not be easy for birth parents
to give their assent to the adopters. This possibility was expressly excluded by
lawmakers in order to reinforce their policy of combating these irregular practices.
30. See PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 184: Pérez Álvarez has observed that what
the law prohibits is that the assent of the parents refer to “specific adopters,” that
is to say, the personalized determination of the adopter, but not the circumstances
that must be present in it. He therefore considers that “nothing precludes the possibility for parents to condition their assent to the fact that the adoptive parents
meet certain circumstances (morality, livelihood, or concurrence of certain family
budgets. . . .).” He adds that “if this is admitted, it would appear that what is excluded is subjectively-conditioned assent, but not assent that would have been
objectively conditioned.” In the same sense, María Angeles Parra Lucán, Autonomía de la voluntad y derecho de familia, in 1 AUTONOMÍA DE LA VOLUNTAD EN
EL DERECHO PRIVADO: ESTUDIOS EN CONMEMORACIÓN DEL 150 ANIVERSARIO DE
LA LEY DEL NOTARIADO 421-422 (Wolters Kluwer 2012).
31. See section VI.
32. Before the LVJ, the matter had been regulated, since 1987, by the Civil
Procedure Act of 1881 under arts. 1829.1(c), 1830. The new law has retained the
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In view of these precepts, the issuance of the biological mother’s
assent is not obligatory before the judge, unlike the consent of those
who are part of the adoption. The law establishes two different moments for the provision of assent—before or after the opening of a
file for a specific adoption and three ways of issuing it: in a public
document, before the public entity, or before the judge, which links
the different phases or moments:
(i) Issuance of assent before the file is opened: the law allows
assent to be given before the adoption file is opened, either before
the public body or in a public document, at the choice of the issuer.
This prior assent must be stated in the proposal of the public entity,
so that the court clerk does not summon the mother and that the
judge is aware of the fulfilment of the requirement. 33
The assent thus given has an expiry period of six months from
its issuance. 34 Although the Voluntary Jurisdiction Law does not expressly say so, it seems that the time at which it must be checked
whether the assent has expired is when the adoption proposal is submitted. This was stated in the previous article 1830.2 LCP. This precept also indicated that, once this period had passed, it was necessary for the assent to be renewed before the judge. The new article
37.1 LVJ does not expressly mention the necessary renewal before
the judge either, but it can be deduced, without a doubt, from the
provision for summoning the subjects in question before the judge.
On the other hand, inasmuch as the law does not establish the
irrevocability of the assent thus given, there does not seem to be any
inconvenience in the possibility that, so long as a file is not initiated,
a retraction of assent may be issued in the same form in which it was
given. In such a case, the mother obligated to give her assent must
be summoned under the terms of article 37.1 LVJ in order to issue
it before the judge, if necessary.
essence of the previous regulation, although with some variation in the wording
of the rules entailing certain substantive changes.
33. See arts. 35.2-35.4 LVJ; see also art. 37.2 LVJ.
34. Art. 37.1.2 LVJ.
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(ii) Issuance of the assent once the file has been opened: once
the file has been opened, the mother who, according to article
177.2 CC, must assent and has not yet done so—either in a public
document or before the public entity—or who, having given her assent more than six months ago such that it has expired, will be summoned to do so before the judge. 35
In regard to the possibility that, having given assent before the
judge, it could be revoked before a decision is made, it is not easily
defensible, just as it happens in the case of consent. Just as consent—of adopters and, if applicable, the adopted—is configured by
the law as an essential element in the constitution of the adoption,
so that it is not possible to imagine an adoption without the favorable
will of those who are a party to it, the same is not true of assent,
since—as has already been explained—the law has no problem in
declaring an adoption without it. It must be also added that a great
deal of damage could be caused to the child by desisting at the last
minute—after the time and energy invested in the procedure—by a
person whose will is not considered essential by the law. 36 For all
these reasons, revocation is not easily justifiable. Notwithstanding
the above, the fact that it does not seem defensible that the mother’s
repentance automatically prevents the constitution of the adoption
does not mean that the judge should disregard it: if he or she is aware
of this circumstance, it should be considered in making the final decision. 37 It should not be forgotten that the judge in the adoption
resolution must decide in accordance with the best interests of the
child. 38

35. Art. 37.1 LVJ.
36. In this sense, you have to count on it. According to Organic Law 8/2015,
of July 22, 2015, art. 2.3(c), the irreversible effect of the passage of time on the
development of the child is an element to be taken into account in determining the
interest of the child.
37. See art. 176.1 CC.
38. See art. 176.1 CC and art. 39.1 LVJ.
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VI. BIRTH MOTHER’S CAPACITY TO ASSENT
The Civil Code does not contain any special provisions regarding the capacity to give assent to adoption. This may pose problems
in cases where the biological mother lacks the general capacity to
act because she has not reached the age of majority 39 or because an
order depriving her of capacity to act has been issued. 40
In such cases, someone could argue that that the assent to the
adoption of the child should be given by the mother’s representatives. However, assent is a strictly personal act, which excludes representation. Proof of this is that the law admits that assent is dispensed with when the one who must give it is unable to do so. 41 It
should be remembered that strictly personal acts are those that, due
to their importance or centrality, can only be performed by the person herself. For these acts, the natural capacity to give valid consent
is sufficient, and representation is excluded. Insofar as the mother’s
assent implies the elimination of the legal mother-child relationship
and the consequent modification of her “civil status,” 42 it falls within
the category of a personal act. Because of this, no one can supplant
her in this decision. Therefore, her natural capacity should be sufficient to issue her assent.

39. See art. 322 CC.
40. See art. 199 CC. See also art. 322 CC. In Spanish law “A person who is
of legal age (18 years old) has capacity for all acts of civil life. . . .” But when the
person of legal age does not have the natural capacity to govern himself, he or she
may be deprived of the capacity to act in law by means of a judicial decision. Art.
199 CC. states: “No one may be declared incapable save pursuant to a court judgement due to the causes set forth in the law.” And art. 200 CC states: “Persistent
physical or mental illnesses or deficiencies which prevent a person from governing himself shall be causes for incapacitation.” A legally incapacitated person has
a guardian who takes care of his or her person and property and who can represent
him or her.
41. See art. 177.2 CC.
42. In Spanish law, “civil status” includes personal situations, endowed with
a certain stability and permanence, which influence the person’s capacity to act
or determine the attribution of specific rights or duties, and which the legal system
considers fundamental for the organization of society, thereby granting them the
same formal regime which basically affects the allocation of certain shares and
the peculiarities of their evidence.
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Concerning the natural capacity to perform strictly personal acts,
the law sometimes establishes a general presumption of aptitude for
specific acts when the person reaches a certain age, thus avoiding
the need to examine capacity in each specific case. For example, in
the case of a will—with the exception of a holographic will—there
is a general presumption of natural capacity to create a valid will
after the age of fourteen. 43 In the case of a marriage, the law indirectly presumes that from the age of sixteen onwards the person has
the capacity to consent to the marriage. 44 When recognizing children, it is also indirectly presumed that the person has the full natural
capacity to do so from the age of sixteen onwards, excluding the
need for judicial approval. 45
This does not hold in the specific case of assent to adoption,
where the law does not establish a presumption of natural capacity
from a specific age. This provision does not seem to impede having
the assent of a minor biological mother as a necessary requirement
for the valid constitution of the adoption. 46 This presumption is all
the more true if one takes into account the legislator’s choice to
make mandatory the will of the minor regarding the adoption: it requires the consent of the adoptee older than twelve and allows dual
adoption by a minor spouse (when the other spouse has reached the
age of twenty-five). 47 On this matter, the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) considered an adoption void on the grounds that the
assent given by the minor biological mother corresponded to a fictitious adoption. 48

43. See arts. 663.1, 688 CC.
44. Compare art. 46 CC with arts. 317, 320 CC.
45. Compare art. 121 CC with arts. 46, 317, 320 CC.
46. Pérez is inclined to consider the mother’ assent to be mandatory in cases
of minority status: see PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 188 n.229; And, in the same vein,
see VARGAS, supra note 8, at 233: in relation to parents, Vargas Cabrera observes
that “the condition of father or mother and sufficient discernment will suffice to
give the corresponding declaration of will.”
47. PÉREZ, supra note 3.
48. See Judgement of the Tribunal Supremo of Jan. 18, 2012.
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Since there is no legal presumption of natural capacity to assent
to an adoption based on age, it is necessary to evaluate on a case-bycase basis whether the biological mother has such natural capacity.
Given that the degree of physical maturity necessary for a woman to
be able to procreate requires her to have reached an age at which she
will normally have acquired some capacity for discernment, she will
usually be in a position to assent, except in situations of too-early
motherhood.
If the biological mother is mentally disabled and a declaration of
incapacity exists, the declaration will usually delimit her legal capacity to assent. If nothing is specified in the declaration or there is
no declaration, she will only lack the capacity to validly assent if
that particular circumstance entails a lack of natural capacity to understand the adoption. 49
In the exceptional case that the mother lacks natural capacity,
she will not be able to give valid assent and, given the strictly personal nature of the act, it will also not be possible—as was previously mentioned—for it to be given by proxy. However, this will
not paralyze the adoption, since the situation fits the de facto case of
“impossibility” mentioned in article 177.2 CC, which allows the
judge to waive the assent and continue with the adoption regardless.
In such cases, however, the mother will simply be heard by the
judge. 50
It should be noted that the strictly personal nature of the mother’s
assent to the adoption excludes not only representation but also assistance: she must give it herself and on her own, without the need,
if she is a minor or is legally incapacitated, for her decision to be
49. These sources also allude to the lack of discernment when there is no
judgement: see MANUEL FELIÚ REY, COMENTARIOS DE LA LEY DE ADOPCIÓN 151
(Tecnos 1989); see also VARGAS, supra note 8, at 240; Roncesvalles Barber Cárcamo, La filiación adoptiva, in 5 TRATADO DE DERECHO DE FAMILIA 701 (2d ed.,
Mariano Yzquierdo Tolsada & Matilde Cuena Casa eds., Aranzadi 2017); Carmen
Callejo Rodríguez, El asentimiento a la adopción de los padres del adoptando no
emancipado, 9 LA LEY DERECHO DE FAMILIA: REVISTA JURÍDICA SOBRE FAMILIA
Y MENORES 13 (2016).
50. See art. 177.3.1 CC.
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accompanied by the consent of her representatives, as is the case
with any act of this nature (will, marriage, recognition of children,
etc.). 51 The parents of the minor or incapacitated mother do not even
have to be heard by the judge. Although traditionally the Civil Code
has relied on expressions of will from other relatives or persons related to the parties to the adoption, Law 21/1987 simplified the
lineup in order to speed up and favor the adoption. However, the fact
that the hearing is not mandatory does not mean that the judge cannot carry it out, if he or she deems it appropriate: article 39.1 LVJ
empowers him or her to “order as many procedural acts as he or she
considers appropriate.”
Finally, it should be noted that, in any case (and as a last resort),
the decision as to whether the adoption is appropriate is in the hands
of the judge, 52 which means that assent is not exempt from judicial
control. In this way, the situation of the minor or the incapacitated
mother is not different from that provided for by the law in other
strictly personal acts in which, given their transcendence, judicial
approval is required. This is what happens, for example, in the case

51. It is surprising that, in the judgement of the Tribunal Supremo of Jan. 18,
2012, the Court unexplainably expressed the idea that the assent of the minor
mother would have required the concurrence of her parents. This can only be justified by the fact that the assent of the biological mother is based on her exercise
of parental authority over her child insofar as art. 157 CC provides that the unemancipated minor shall exercise parental authority with the assistance of his or
her parents. In this regard, it should be noted that some authors have understood,
along these lines, that assent is contained in the functions of parental authority:
see Barber, supra note 49, at 706. Without denying that, in most cases, the parents
agree to the adoption for the sake of the child and are therefore carrying out an act
of protection proper to the exercise of this power, it should not be overlooked that
this is not always the case (at least directly): a parent may assent to the adoption
simply because, thinking of himself or herself, he or she does not want a parental
relationship; and, on the other hand, the relationship with the child is more than
parental authority, therefore—as already stated—the basis of assent goes beyond
this power and lies in the parental relationship. This precludes the application of
art. 157 CC to the assent of the biological mother and excludes the need for parental assistance. On the other hand, this entails—as has been developed in the
text—its consideration as a strictly personal act, which can only be carried out by
the person himself, personally and solely, eliminating the intervention of the parents or representatives.
52. See art. 176 CC.
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of recognition of children by those judged mentally incapable or minors. 53
In view of the above, it is desirable to introduce into article
177 CC a specific regulation of the biological mother’s capacity to
assent to the adoption in order to avoid the court having to infer it
by resorting to a systematic interpretation. This is particularly critical because it is not uncommon for the biological mother to be a
minor, especially when the adoption takes place immediately after
birth. Adding this regulation would prevent doubt and provide legal
certainty.
VII. THE SIX-WEEK PERIOD: A LIMITATION ON THE AUTONOMY OF
WOMEN’S WILL
Since the 1987 reform, the Civil Code has contained a limitation
on the biological mother’s ability to give assent, which has recently
been intensified. The European Convention on the Adoption of Children, executed in Strasbourg on April 24, 1967, established in article
5.4 a minimum period of six weeks after birth for the mother to give
her assent to adoption. Some countries have included this period—
or an even longer one—as part of their legislation. 54 Others dispensed with a minimum period. 55 Spain did not ratify the Convention and opted—as Pérez Álvarez notes 56—for an intermediate position between the six-week period set by the Convention and the absence of a time limit, setting instead a minimum period of 30 days
from birth. Initially, the period envisaged in the 1987 Law Draft was
fifteen days, but an amendment passed, extending it to thirty days.57
53. See art. 121 CC.
54. See PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 187, n.226; England and Germany are cited
as examples.
55. Id. at 187. Pérez Álvarez noted that the idea of the time limit was not
without controversy: the limit was criticized because the mother’s relationship
with her child could make adoption difficult.
56. Id.
57. See BOCG, Congreso de los Diputados, III legislatura, Serie A: Proyectos
de Ley, Mar. 13, 1987 No. 22-4, 25. See also the report of the conference favorable to its acceptance: BOCG, Congreso de los Diputados, III legislatura, Serie A:
Proyectos de Ley, June 2, 1987, No. 22-5, 67; and the approval by the
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The 2008 European Convention on the Adoption of Children,
which replaced the 1967 Convention, establishes in article 5.5 that
“[a] mother’s consent to the adoption of her child shall be valid
when it is given at such time after the birth of the child, not being
less than six weeks, as may be prescribed by law. . . .” It also gives
countries the option of not specifying a particular period, instead allowing the mother to give her assent when the competent authority
determines that she has recovered from the consequences of childbirth. Since Spain has ratified the European Convention on Adoption, the 2015 reform has been used to adapt the Civil Code to the
new international standard, opting, along the lines maintained since
1987, to establish a specific period of time, surely because it is considered to provide more certainty. Thus, Law 26/2015 has modified
article 177.2.2 CC and has extended the period during which the
mother can assent to the adoption, from thirty days to six weeks from
the birth: “The assent of the mother cannot be given until six weeks
have elapsed since the birth.” 58
This means that a woman’s assent is not valid during pregnancy
or even after delivery, so long as six weeks have not passed. This
was made clear by the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) in its
well-known September 21, 1999 decision, which was handed down
Commission with full legislative competence: BOCG, Congreso de los Diputados, III legislatura, Serie A: Proyectos de Ley, June 20, 1987, No. 22-6, 90.
58. The number of countries that have ratified the Convention is low. Such
countries usually provide for a longer minimum period, but not only for the
mother but for the two parents: eight weeks in Germany (§ 1747 BGB: “Die Einwilligung kann erst erteilt werden, wenn das Kind acht Wochen alt ist.”) and Finland (Section 15, Act No. 22/2012, adopted on Jan. 20, 2012: “A parent’s consent
to an adoption may not be received until the parent has had the opportunity to
consider the matter thoroughly and eight weeks have elapsed from the birth of the
child.”); two months in Belgium (art. 348.4 Code civil: “La mère et le père ne
peuvent consentir à l’adoption que deux mois après la naissance de l’enfant.”) and
Norway (Section 10, Act of June 16, 2017, No. 48 relating to adoption: “the parents’ consent may not be given until two months after the birth of the child.”);
sixty days in Romania (art. 466 C.Civ.: “Consimţământul la adopţie al părinţilor
fireşti sau, după caz, al tutorelui poate fi dat numai după trecerea unui termen de
60 de zile de la data naşterii copilului.”); three months in Denmark (The Danish
Adoption Act, No. 8: “Consent cannot be accepted before three (3) months after
the birth of the child, unless special circumstances prevail.”).
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under the previous version of the provision. The court considered
null and void, in violation of a mandatory rule, the assent to adoption
given by a woman in her eighth month of pregnancy in a document
explaining that she could not take care of her child because of family, social, emotional and economic circumstances and stating that
she had been informed of her rights and the consequences of her
assent. 59
Given the importance of assent to adoption, the reason for the
rule contained in article 177 CC is to allow the woman to achieve
the emotional stability necessary to evaluate the different options
with perspective and calm and to decide with full freedom and conscience. 60 Similarly, the Council of Europe has explained that the
objective of article 5.5 of the European Convention on Adoption is
“to avoid premature adoptions to which mothers give their consent
as a result of pressure exerted before the birth of the child or before
their physical health and psychological balance have been restored
after the child’s birth.” 61 On the other hand, it cannot be ignored that
the prohibition to give consent during pregnancy also has the
59. On this judgement, see, e.g., among others: María Ballesteros de los Ríos,
Reclamación de filiación materna frustrada por la no práctica de una prueba
biológica esencial y adopción declarada nula por asentimiento prestado con anterioridad al parto, 13 DERECHO PRIVADO Y CONSTITUCIÓN 37 et seq. (1999);
GUTIÉRREZ, supra note 9, at 132 et seq.
60. The amendment of the 1987 draft law, which led to the extension of the
period from 15 to 30 days, was justified on the grounds that the period was too
short and that it was appropriate to extend it so that the mother, who had already
recovered, was “in full freedom and conscience to gauge the seriousness of the
act of assent to the adoption of her child.” See BOCG, Congreso de los Diputados,
III legislatura, Serie A: Proyectos de Ley, Mar. 13, 1987, No. 22-4, 25. The aforementioned Judgement of the Tribunal Supremo of Sept. 21, 1999 explains that
“the reasons for this legal caution are explained by the need to ensure that the
essential faculties of freedom and conscience are fully present in the biological
mother, so that she can carefully and serenely measure the renunciation of the
exercise of her motherhood with the child’s release for adoption.” And, more recently, in the Report on the Preliminary Draft of 2015, the General Council of the
Judiciary expressed its support for the extension of the deadline to six weeks as it
ensures “the greatest possible peace of mind and the freedom of the mother to
grant her assent,” see Consejo General del Poder Judicial, Informe del Consejo
General del Poder Judicial al Anteproyecto de Ley de Protección a la Infancia
84 (Sept. 30, 2014).
61. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the European Convention on
the Adoption of Children (Revised) 6, #202 (Strasbourg, Nov. 27, 2008).
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objective of fighting against child trafficking and even against practices that may favor surrogacy, which is prohibited by Spanish law.
Given the good intentions of the legislator that can be seen in the
inclusion of this caution, this waiting period has been accepted naturally and without further discussion. 62 However, perhaps it is time
for further reflection on this issue, not only at the national level but
also at the European level, in light of the new social and legal realities and trends.
In recent years, there has been an increase in the autonomy of
the will in all areas, especially in the areas of persons and family. 63
This autonomy extends to all persons, including those who have traditionally been protected by depriving them of their capacity to decide because of their special characteristics. 64 A reform of the Spanish Civil Code is planned to remove the judicial incapacity of persons with disabilities 65 in order to adapt the internal order to the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006). This Convention changes the paradigm and establishes
that the autonomy of the will of these persons must be promoted and

62. See, e.g., FELIÚ, supra note 49, at 151; VARGAS, supra note 8, at 237;
GUTIÉRREZ, supra note 9, at 131; Artero, supra note 17, at 67; GESTO, supra note
17, at 70 et seq.; Sonia Calaza López, El nuevo proceso de filiación por adopción,
36 REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO PROCESAL 240 (2015); Cárcamo, supra note
49, at 715-716; Callejo, supra note 49, at 6-7; Carlos Martínez de Aguirre Aldaz,
La historia interminable: una nueva reforma de la adopción, in EL NUEVO RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DEL MENOR: LA REFORMA LEGISLATIVA DE 2015 342 (Maria Victoria Mayor del Hoyo ed., Aranzadi 2017).
63. On the subject, see Parra, supra note 30, at 97 et seq.
64. On the new trend in favor of the autonomy of persons with disabilities
generated since the 2006 U.N. Convention on the Rights of Personas and Disabilities, see, e.g., MONTSERRAT PEREÑA VICENTE ET AL., LA VOLUNTAD DE LA PERSONA PROTEGIDA: OPORTUNIDADES RIESGOS Y SALVAGUARDAS (Dykinson 2018);
SOFIA DE SALAS MURILLO & MARIA VICTORIA MAYOR DEL HOYO, CLAVES PARA
LA ADAPTACIÓN DEL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO PRIVADO A LA CONVENCIÓN DE
NACIONES UNIDAS EN MATERIA DE DISCAPACIDAD (Tirant lo Blanch 2019).
65. See Anteproyecto de Ley por la que se reforma la legislación civil y procesal para el apoyo a las personas con discapacidad en el ejercicio de su capacidad jurídica (Jan. 2019).
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protected: they must be able to decide for themselves, and they have
the right to make mistakes. 66
This trend that empowers the autonomy of the will clashes with
the paternalism that the law still maintains, in matters of adoption,
with respect to pregnant women or women who have just become
mothers. The Code, finding its justification in the importance of the
decision, deprives women in these circumstances of any possibility
to decide on the matter, on the assumption that they lack the capacity
to do so. This is an irrebuttable presumption, i.e., one which does
not admit evidence to the contrary. This presumption, in addition to
affecting the free development of the woman’s personality, may
place her in a complicated situation, extending the suffering and
psychological burden that may be involved in having a pending decision regarding her child and going through the issuance of assent.
However, this lack of confidence in the decision-making capacity of
the pregnant woman has been abandoned by the legislator in other
areas: the law itself, in Organic Law 2/2010, of March 3, 2010, on
Sexual and Reproductive Health and the Voluntary Interruption of
Pregnancy (in which no limitations of this type are introduced), defends the importance of the autonomy of the woman’s will in matters of filiation. It maintains that the decision about children “constitutes one of the most intimate and personal matters that people
face throughout their lives, which integrates an essential area of individual self-determination” and that “the protection of this area of
personal autonomy has a singular significance for women.” 67
It cannot be ignored that, at times, the emotional tension—characteristic of human beings—that surrounds the birth of a child, as
well as the pressure of certain personal, economic, and social circumstances, can constitute a handicap in decision-making regarding
the relationship of filiation. It is, therefore, understandable that the
66. See U.N. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General
Comment No. 1, Article 12: Equal Recognition Before the Law (2014),
https://perma.cc/U7TF-QMQ6.
67. See Organic Law 2/2010, of March 3, 2010, on Sexual and Reproductive
Health and the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy, Section I of the Preamble.
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legal system should adopt some caution that takes this reality into
account for the benefit of all parties.
However, the legislator must find a balance between this caution
and the exercise of the decision-making power. It must also take into
account all those involved. It is true that in the tension that surrounds
birth there is an important physical component that (obviously) only
affects women and that can even be complicated by conditions such
as postpartum depression. 68 However, this tension does not have an
exclusively physical origin, but rather has another psychological
component that derives naturally from the arrival of a child into the
world and is present in both parents. Therefore, even if it is not what
is usually done, when filiation is determined with regard to the father, (for example, because of the existence of marriage 69) these
considerations should also be taken into account with regard to him.
In order to ensure this integrative balance, the law could allow
parents to give their assent to adoption at any time during pregnancy
and at any time after birth, but with the possibility of freely revoking
it within a period of time, which could be, for example, during the
two or three months immediately following birth. 70 The determination of the period of revocability should take into account the child’s

68. On the subject, see DANIELA WADIA JARUFE CONTRERAS, TRATAMIENTO
LEGAL DE LAS FILIACIONES NO BIOLÓGICAS EN EL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO ESPAÑOL: ADOPCIÓN VERSUS TÉCNICAS DE REPRODUCCIÓN HUMANA ASISTIDA 241-242

(Dykinson 2013).
69. See art. 116 CC.
70. This possibility is not alien to the legislator, who already raised it in the
drafting of the 1987 Act. Thus, the first Draft Law, of Mar. 10, 1986, proposed
the following wording of art. 176.3 CC: “The irrevocable assent of the mother of
the adoptee shall not be accepted until fifteen days have elapsed since the birth”
(emphasis added). In favor of it, see PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 187, n.228. In some
previous work I already defended the prior provision of a revocable assent: see
Maria Victoria Mayor del Hoyo, Más allá del acogimiento de menores: incapacitados, tercera edad y nasciturus, 734 REVISTA CRÍTICA DE DERECHO INMOBILIARIO 3235-3236 (2012); MARIA VICTORIA MAYOR DEL HOYO, LA ADOPCIÓN EN
EL DERECHO COMÚN ESPAÑOL 243 et seq. (Tirant lo Blanch 2019). In the same
vein, see Parra, supra note 30, at 422. also spoke in favor of a system similar to
this one, setting the deadline for revocation within two months after childbirth:
see JARUFE, supra note 68, at 241 (previously, in the defense of his doctoral dissertation, he already advocated this possibility).
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interest in not prolonging uncertainty in order to avoid the irreversible effect of the passage of time on his or her development. 71
In particular, a system could be set up to provide assent in the
form of a public document that can be registered ex officio by the
notary in a registry created ad hoc. Once the assent has been issued
in these terms, the parents could, at any moment before the deadline
set by law, change their mind in a new notarized document. Once
this period of time has elapsed without exercise of the power of revocation, the assent given would automatically become firm and no
new manifestation of will—not even a confirmation of the previous
one—would be necessary. With that firmness, the manifestation of
will would acquire—by virtue of the law—the juridical condition of
valid assent to adopt, that is assent ad adoptionem, and would open
the door to the possible constitution of the adoption. Moreover, this
assent would not expire. The public body and the judge would only
need to consult the assent kept in the registry.
This is my proposal de lege ferenda: this proposal would allow
respect for the autonomy of the will of women who would not be
deprived of their capacity to decide because they are in a state of
gestation or have recently given birth, favoring the free development
of their personality and facilitating things at a difficult time for them,
in a manner that is coherent with the rest of the order and the new
social reality.
At the same time, it would allow the introduction of a prudent
caution that, given the complexity of the situation, could be of help,
both by offering calm to those making the decision and by facilitating, if necessary, conformation with the perspective of the will. It
could even be said that this option allows for greater perspective,
given that the proposed system would allow the extension of the
term given to consider the decision.

71. See Organic Law 8/2015, of July 22, 2015, art. 2.3 c).
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The proposal would not be detrimental to the child since the
limit to the power of revocation would be determined by the child’s
interest.
The proposal would also enable birth parents to be placed on an
equal footing with respect to each other, by adapting the system once
again to the new social sensibilities.
The proposal would solve the problem, already denounced by
the Special Committee of the Senate that studied the adoption, 72 that
sometimes causes the disappearance of the mother when she leaves
the hospital, before the deadline for her to give her assent to the
adoption has passed.
The system would in no way constitute an adoption of the nasciturus, insofar as the adoption could only be constituted from the
moment the assent became final. And, moreover, the current adoption procedure is designed, as already stated, to firmly prevent any
irregular practice related to child trafficking or other actions prohibited by law. It should be remembered, on the one hand, that it is the
responsibility of the public entity to declare the suitability and selection of the adopters and that, except in the case of assessed cases,
for an adoption file to be opened it must be proposed by the public
entity. And, on the other hand, the adoption is constituted by judicial
resolution with the guarantees that this implies.
Finally, from a teleological point of view, the system would not
conflict with the European Convention on Adoption, given that the
mother’s assent would only be understood to have been given, in the
strict or technical sense, once the previously expressed wish had become firm because the two or three months following the birth, fixed
by law, had elapsed without revocation. Only at that time, and not
before (as it is subject to revocation), would the will be said to acquire the legal status of assent and be valid. In any case, it would be
desirable that in future revisions of the European Convention on
72. See Informe de la Comisión Especial de Estudio de la problemática de la
adopción nacional y otros temas afines, BOCG, Senado, IX legislatura, Series I,
Nov. 17, 2010, No. 545, at 9, 17, 20, 49, 53.
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Adoption, the content of article 5.5 be reconsidered, in order to adapt
it to the new realities and to avoid inappropriate limitations on the
woman’s capacity to decide.
Until this revision of the European Convention on Adoption is
done, the proposal may be extrapolated, with the appropriate adaptations, to the other European legal systems mentioned above that
have ratified the Convention and that, following the provisions of
the Convention, limit the autonomy of the will of women by setting
a minimum time limit for giving assent to adoption.

